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Rebuilding the Prevent Defense: Why
Unethical Agents Continue to Score
and What Can Be Done to Change the
Game
ABSTRACT
Despite decades of regulation, college athletics continues to face
problems stemming from agents' unethical and illegal tactics in
recruiting student-athletes. The NCAA, Congress, state legislatures,
and professional players unions have all sought to regulate the
interaction between athletes and agents in various ways, often leading
to conflicts and gaps within existing laws, which some agents readily
exploit. Agents frequently slip through the law's porous prevent defense
while the brunt of enforcement and public opprobrium falls on
unsophisticatedstudent-athletes and their schools-who are frequently
outsiders to the saga. This Note explores the causes resulting in an
atmosphere of noncompliance, including the varying goals of
regulators and the attitudes of student-athletes.
This Note
recommends changes within the current system to encourage agent
compliance, ensure greater transparency in the interactions between
agents and student-athletes, and lessen draconian NCAA restrictions
on student-athlete behavior. A unified, streamlined, less restrictive
system will be more protective of student-athletes interests and
encourage ethical agent behavior.
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"To stop agents from paying players, the NCAA will have to
stop college students from wanting money and thinking they're
invincible-and stop agents from wanting to land clients. Good luck
with that."'
The average first-round pick in the 2010 National Football
League (NFL) draft stands to earn $28.57 million over the life of his
contract, with $17.06 million in guaranteed money. 2 The twenty most
valuable college football programs of 2009 earned an average of $35.15
million in profits.3 Although major college athletics may be about
more than money, these and similar figures necessarily marginalize
any non-monetary concerns in the cost-benefit calculus of National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) member schools, studentathletes, and athlete-agents. 4 The large amounts of money pervading
college athletics skews the cost-benefit analysis underlying the
behavior of all parties, often resulting in malfeasance in the eyes of
regulating bodies, which may penalize all actors and institutions
involved, guilty or not.

1.
Michael Rosenberg, NCAA Facing Uphill Battle to Control Agents Paying Players,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 13, 2010, 11:45 AM), http://www.http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
2010/writers/michaelrosenberg/10/13/ncaa.agents/index.html.
2.
Contract Status of 2010 First-Round Draft Picks, NFL.COM (Aug. 6, 2010, 6:06 PM),
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d818ff636/article/contract-status-of-2010-firstround-draftpicks.
3.
Peter J. Schwartz, College Football's Most Valuable Teams, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2009,
7:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/12/22/most-vaulable-college-football-teams-businesssportscollege-football.html.
4.
See Virginia A. Fitt, The NCAA's Lost Cause and the Legal Ease of Redefining
Amateurism, 59 DUKE L.J. 555, 567 (2009) ("As few thoughtful observers doubt, [intercollegiate
football and men's basketball at major NCAA institutions] are fantastically commercial and
decidedly not amateur.").
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Throughout 2010, the sports world has seen allegations and
revelations of agent improprieties in courting student-athletes,
especially the provision of improper benefits.5 In June 2010, the
NCAA concluded a lengthy investigation of the University of Southern
California's athletics programs for violations of the Association's rules
governing athlete agent 6 interactions and amateurism involving
former stars Reggie Bush and O.J. Mayo.7 The NCAA's findings led to
the imposition of substantial penalties including postseason bans,
vacated wins, and scholarship reductions in football and men's
basketball, as well as revenue forfeitures and probation for the
programs involved.8 Subsequently, Reggie Bush, who now plays
professionally with the New Orleans Saints, returned his 2005
Heisman Trophy under significant pressure, the first forfeiture in the
prestigious award's history.9 In October 2010, former sports agent
Josh Luchs admitted to providing thousands of dollars in money and
benefits to numerous college football players throughout the 1990s.10
Despite continuing efforts by the NCAA, professional players unions,
and state and federal legislators to address agent misconduct, the
problem persists."
This Note examines the current regulatory scheme purporting
to govern improper athlete-agent conduct, identifies the major
insufficiencies of the current regime, and proposes necessary changes
that will maintain the NCAA's ideal of fully non-professional
intercollegiate athletics, sufficiently protect and prepare studentathletes in their dealings with agents, and regulate egregious agent
conduct. Part L.A of this Note discusses the current status of the
athlete-agent business model and the potential effects of unscrupulous
agent conduct on student-athletes and their schools. Part I.B focuses
on the many institutions involved in the current regulatory regime,
See Robert Gagliardi, Can the NCAA Realistically Stop Agents?, THE LARAMIE
5.
BOOMERANG (July 22, 2010), http://www.laramieboomerang.com/articles/2010/07/22/sports/
doc4c47ca3lca 11 1063426154.txt.
The phrase "athlete-agent" will be used throughout this note to refer to individuals
6.
commonly called agents, or sports agents.
News Release, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Division I Committee on Infractions
7.
Issues Decision on University of Southern California (June 10, 2010), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/ncaa/ncaalmedia+and+events/press+room/news+release+a
rchive/2010/infractions/20100610+dl+coi+usc (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
8.
Id.
Reggie Bush to Forfeit Heisman, ESPN.COM (Sept. 15, 2010, 1:13 PM), http://
9.
2
sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/nef/news/story?id=557 827.
10.
George Dohrmann, Confessions of an Agent, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 18, 2010),
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1175725/index.htm.
See, e.g., Charles Robinson & Dan Wetzel, Sources: Blake Recommended Agent to
11.
Dareus, YAHOO! SPORTS (Oct. 3, 2010, 10:48 PM), http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaalfootball/
news?slug-ys-dareusl00310.
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which aim to curb agent misfeasance in recruiting student-athletes.
Part II discusses the major problems the current regulatory scheme
presents, and Part III proposes a multi-faceted reform within the
confines of contemporary regulations. This Note argues that unless
the relevant regulatory bodies take a more proactive stance, studentathletes will continue to bear the brunt of scrutiny and punishment,
while agents will continue to skirt the law in the hopes of landing a
star player.
I. WHERE WE ARE Now AND How WE GOT HERE

A. The Athlete-Agent Industry: Competition and Problems
In an era of ballooning player salaries, overcrowded agent
markets, and limitations on agent contract commissions, competition
among agents for clients has erupted, creating an unethical arms race
of sorts, whereby agents break the rules to reel in the biggest fish.12
Even given the stable pool of potential professional athletes in the
college ranks, the number of would-be agents continues to increase,
sparking fiercer competition and encouraging increasingly unethical
behavior. 13 Despite the relatively miniscule chance that a studentathlete will become a professional, agents frequently engage in
unethical or illegal activities to recruit potential clients. Agents use a
variety of recruiting techniques, including sales puffing-knowingly
overestimating a student-athlete's professional value to ensure
signing. 14 Sports agents also employ runners, or financially interested
third-party intermediaries, to befriend athletes and provide day-to-day
influence and benefits. 15 Additionally, some agents may go beyond
direct recruiting, providing cash or other benefits to athletes' families
Finally, agents may even resort to threats or
and friends.16
Some commentators suggest that the difficulties of
extortion. 17
12.
Eric Willenbacher, Regulating Sports Agents: Why Current Federaland State Efforts
Do Not Deter the Unscrupulous Athlete-Agent and How a National Licensing System May Cure
the Problem, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2004).
Timothy Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry: Intended and Unintended
13.
Consequences, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 781, 785-86 (2006) (noting instances of client stealing,
agent disparagement, and improper benefits).
Willenbacher, supra note 12, at 1228.
14.
15.
Ben Bolch, "A Third Party Can Make for Shady Deals," L.A. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at
http://articles.latimes.com/20081julll31sports/sp-runnersl3.
See Charles Robinson and Jason Cole, "Cash and Carry: Reggie Bush Investigation,"
16.
YAHOO! SPORTS, Sept. 15, 2006, at http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaalfootball/news?slug-ys-bushprobe
(detailing material benefits provided by agents to the family of then-USC student-athlete Reggie
Bush).
17.
See, e.g., Peter H. Frank, "F.B.I. Is Reported to Be Investigating Threats By
Agents," NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 27, 1987, at http://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/27/sports/fbi-is-
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entering the agent business, combined with the enormous potential for
wealth, motivates agents to do "whatever it takes" to land a client.18
The consequences of unscrupulous agent conduct for studentathletes and their educational institutions are severe.1 9 An athlete
who violates NCAA bylaws regulating amateurism stands to lose both
his athletic eligibility and his athletic scholarship. 20 NCAA member
institutions face sanctions, including loss of revenues, forfeiture of
victories and scholarships, and postseason bans. 21 Additionally,
NCAA scandals create a negative perception of college athletics,
vilifying both student-athletes and the schools. 22 However, the agent
behind the NCAA violations and resulting scandal escapes similar
public opprobrium, given his relative anonymity in comparison to the
student-athlete and the university. 23 Thus, the penalties fall wholly
on the most public parties, while the unseen agents slip through the
cracks, further encouraging an atmosphere of noncompliance. 24

B. ContemporaryRegulatory Schemes for Athlete-Agents
1. NCAA Regulations
The NCAA describes the "basic purpose" of its "fundamental
policy" as maintaining amateurism-by defining a clear line between
intercollegiate and professional competition. 25 The NCAA's efforts to
reported-to-be-investigating-threats-by-agents.html (documenting alleged threats and extortion
by agents Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom).
18.
Davis, supranote 13, at 798.
19.
This is not to suggest that student-athletes are never at fault for accepting gifts
from, or entering into agreements with, agents. However, given the sophistication of the parties
and the resources imbalance, student-athletes are, in most situations, less blameworthy.
20.
Willenbacher, supra note 12, at 1230.
21.
Id. at 1231.
22.
Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act: Hearing on 108 H.R. 351 Before the
Subcomm. On Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 108th Cong.
4, 6-7 (2003) (statement of Rep. Osborne, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) [hereinafter
JudiciarySubcomm. Hearing].
23.
Id.
24.
The NCAA frequently punishes schools for "failing to promote an atmosphere of
compliance." See, e.g., News Release, NCAA, Division I Committee On Infractions Issues
Decision On University Of Connecticut (Feb. 22, 2011, available at http://www.
ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/ncaalNCAAIMedia+and+Events/Press+RoomlNews+Release+Archive/
2011/Infractions/Division+I+Committee+On+Infractions+Issues+Decision+On+University+Of+C
onnecticut; News Release, NCAA, Division II Committee on Infractions Issues Decision on
University of Southern Indiana (Feb. 4, 2011), available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/
wcm/connect/ncaa/NCAAIMedia+and+Events/Press+Room/News+Release+Archive/201 1[Infractio
ns/20110204+D2+COI+Southern+Indiana.
25.
NCCA BYLAWS §§ 1.2-1.3, reprinted in NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETHIC ASS'N, 200910 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL (2009), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/product
downloads/D11O.pdf [hereinafter NCAA BYLAWS].
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promote the amateurism ideal fall into two major categories:
preventing pay-for-play, and clearly distinguishing intercollegiate
from professional athletics. 26 Anti-remuneration rules prohibit a
student-athlete from leveraging his athletics ability "directly or
indirectly" for any form of pay, promise of future pay, or any form of
financial aid not available to the student body at-large. 27 Clearbarrier regulations restrict the interactions between student-athletes,
coaches, agents, and professional sports organizations. 28
The amateurism provisions of the NCAA Bylaws advance the
goal of "maintaining a clear line of demarcation between college
athletics and professional sports."29 Commonly referred to as the "no
agent rule," the NCAA's primary athlete-agent regulation renders a
student-athlete ineligible for intercollegiate competition "if he or she
has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for the
purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that
sport."30 Additionally, all agency contracts are presumed applicable to
all sports in which the student-athlete participates, rendering him
ineligible to participate in any future NCAA competition, regardless of
sport, unless explicitly stated otherwise in contractual language. 31
The prohibition on agency contracts also applies to agreements
regarding future representation, as well as those made by high school
athletes or graduates before college enrollment. 32
In a small exception to the "no agent rule," the NCAA permits
an individual to retain an advisor concerning a proposed professional
sports contract without compromising his eligibility, but prohibits the
advisor from representing a student-athlete-including attending
contract negotiations or directly contacting a professional sports
organization on her behalf-without impacting her eligibility. 33 The
NCAA makes no distinction between lawyers and non-lawyers on this
point, instead permitting a student-athlete to seek advice from any
individual regarding professional negotiations, provided that no active
Like the regulations governing agency
representation occurs. 34
agreements and receipts of benefits, those governing legal counsel

26.
Fitt, supra note 4, at 564.
27.
NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 25, §§ 12.1.2, 12.3.1.1, 12.4.
28.
Id.
29.
Id. § 12.01.2.
30.
Id. § 12.3.1.
Id.
31.
32.
Id. § 12.3.1.1.
33.
Id. § 12.3.2.
34.
Richard T. Karcher, The NCAA's Regulations Related to the Use of Agents in the
Sport of Baseball:Are the Rules Detrimentalto the Best Interest of the Amateur Athlete?, 7 VAND.
J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 215, 217 (2005).
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apply to student-athletes both before and after they enroll in college. 35
In the eyes of the NCAA, the critical distinction is whether an
individual serves merely as an "advisor" or actually "represents" the
individual in negotiations, either by presence during contract
negotiation or by active discussion.36
Under these regulations, student-athletes and their guardians
may interact with professional teams on their own-even negotiating
a professional contract-without loss of eligibility. 37 Additionally, an
NCAA member institution may establish a "professional sports
counseling panel" for the benefit of its student-athletes. 38 This
counseling panel is essentially an alternative mechanism for providing
some traditional agent functions, including advising the student about
professional prospects, helping him secure a personal injury insurance
policy, reviewing proposed professional contracts, arranging meetings
with professional teams, securing professional tryouts, and
determining an athlete's market value.3 9 An NCAA student-athlete's
head coach may conduct many of the same services, including helping
the athlete select an agent and determining the student-athlete's
market value, so long as the head coach receives no compensation for
these services from an agent, and he follows NCAA-mandated
reporting requirements. 40
Perhaps most pertinently, the "no benefits rule" deems an
for accepting
competition
for NCAA
ineligible
individual
"transportation or other benefits from . . . [a]ny person who represents

any individual in the marketing of his or her athletics ability; or [a]n
agent," even if the agent has indicated that he has no interest in
representing the student-athlete and does not represent others in the
student-athlete's sport. 41 Notably, the regulations presume that any
expenses received by student-athletes are based on athletic skill and
are therefore an extra benefit unavailable to the general student

Id. Thus, high school athletes, namely high school baseball players (and potentially
35.
basketball players, depending on the future status of the NBA's age limit), may test their draft
status and even negotiate with professional teams, but must do so on the inherently unequal
terms of non-representation. Id.

36.

Overview of NCAA Bylaws Governing Athlete Agents, NCAA.ORG (July 29, 2010),

http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/publiclNCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2010+news+stories/July+
latest+news/Overview+of+NCAA+bylaws+governing+athlete+agents.
37.
NCAA BYLAws, supra note 25, § 12.2.4.2.
Id. § 12.3.4.
38.
Id.
39.
40.
Id. § 11.1.4.1. Coaches are required to report their activities to either their
institution's counseling panel or, in the absence of a panel, to their university's president or
chancellor. Id.
41.
Id. § 12.3.1.2.
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body. 42 Additionally, by referring to the receipt of benefits by any
"individual," the regulations apply to a class broader than currently
enrolled college athletes, including future college recruits still enrolled
in high school or preparatory institutions.43 Thus, student-athletes
cannot avoid NCAA sanctions by only receiving benefits before
enrollment.44
The NCAA, in response to the participation of ineligible
student-athletes in its competitions, may impose a variety of penalties
on student-athletes, with potentially severe consequences for both the
athlete and the member institution. 45 Because the NCAA lacks
jurisdiction to regulate agents directly, any penalties it imposes for
violations of its bylaws fall directly and disproportionately on studentathletes and educational institutions. 46 In the face of these coverage
gaps, legislators and judges have created a variety of regulatory
regimes to police what the NCAA could not-misconduct by the agents
themselves. 47
2. Common Law and Pre-UAAA State Legislation
Historically, state common law provided causes of action for
student-athletes and educational institutions to bring against
unprincipled athlete-agents. 48 The nature of the relationship binding
student-athletes, agents, and educational institutions brings many of
their interactions within the scope of agency and contract law. 4 9
However, a variety of countervailing forces, including the doctrine of
contributory negligence, as well as a reluctance to file suit, resulted in
few civil actions against agents under the common law.5 0
Under agency law, a student-athlete could hypothetically bring
a sports-agent malpractice suit, alleging a violation of the duty of care
owed to the student-athlete. 51 The agent, placed in a fiduciary
position by his agreement to represent the student-athlete, is
presumed to know the relevant NCAA regulations and any actions in

Id.
42.
43.
Id. § 12.3.1.2(a).
Id.
44.
45.
Id. § 19.5.
46.
Diane Sudia & Rob Remis, Athlete Agent Legislation in the New Millennium: State
Statutes and the Uniform Athlete Agents Act, 11 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 263, 268-69 (2001).
47.
See infra Parts I.B.2-5.
48.
John A. Gray, Sports Agent's Liability After SPARTA?, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
141, 143 (2006).
49.
See id.
50.
See id.; Willenbacher, supra note 12, at 1251.
51.
Gray, supra note 48, at 143.
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violation thereof. 52 As such, any failure to ensure that a studentathlete knew of the consequences of entering into an agency contract
or accepting benefits would breach his fiduciary duty, rendering the
agent liable for the student's ineligibility. 5 3 However, as NCAA
student-athletes are generally expected to know and adhere to NCAA
regulations, 54 a defense of contributory or comparative negligence
would likely mitigate an agent's liability or lower a potential damages
award.5 5
The common law theory of tortious interference with
contractual relations could also potentially provide an NCAA member
institution a cause of action against an agent.5 6 Tortious interference
occurs when a third party, who knows that a contract exists,
intentionally causes a party to breach it.57 If a court finds a
contractual relationship between the school and student-athlete,5 8
either in a financial aid agreement,5 9 or National Letter of Intent,6 0
the court will presume the agent is aware of the contract and its
terms, including the requirement that the student-athlete adhere to
NCAA regulations. 61 The agent's conduct, in consciously entering into
a contract or providing benefits in derogation of the student-athlete's
contract with his educational institution, directly contributes to any
resultant ineligibility and NCAA-imposed penalties for the school. 62
Absence the agent's offering of a contract or benefits-both intentional
actions-no contractual breach between the student-athlete and

52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
See Willenbacher, supra note 12, at 1240 ("[I]f the court was willing to find a breach
of contract for violation of (school-imposed) training rules the court, presumably, would also find
a breach of contract when the athlete fails to conform to NCAA eligibility requirements that were
also an element of the contractual relationship" (citing Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 16 N.C.
App. 17 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972)).
55.
Gray, supra note 48, at 143.
56.
Id.
Id.
57.
58.
See Kevin Stangel, Protecting Universities' Economic Interests: Holding StudentAthletes and Coaches Accountable for Willful Violations of NCAA Rules, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 137, 140-42 (2000); see also Willenbacher, supranote 12, at 1240-41.
59.
Generally, courts have based this holding on a finding that financial benefits
constitute valid consideration for a student-athlete's participation in NCAA competition. Stangel,
supra note 58, at 140-46.
60.
A National Letter of Intent is a voluntary program whereby a prospective studentathlete (recruit) pledges to attend a university for at least one academic year and the university
promises to provide financial aid for that year, with an included prohibition on recruiting the
student-athlete by any other institution. About the National Letter of Intent, NCAA.ORG,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/nlilNLI/About+the+NLI (last visited Feb. 14, 2011).
61.
Gray, supranote 48, at 144.
62.
Willenbacher, supranote 12, at 1242.
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institution would have occurred.63 Although an agent may argue that
he did not intend for the student-athlete to breach his contract with
the university, a person acting with knowledge of a likely
consequence-here, contractual breach-is generally held to have
Thus, regardless of the motivations or
intended that result. 6 4
awareness of the student-athlete, an NCAA member could argue that
the agent's conduct caused the contractual violation and establish
liability.65
Over time, the common law regime proved less than effective in
regulating athlete-agent activities, largely due to problems with proof
of causation and reluctance to sue. 66 To protect local universities and
student-athlete residents, as well as provide a more reliable
enforcement mechanism, many states began to enact legislation to
govern the actions of athlete-agents. 6 7 By 2001, twenty-six states had
enacted statutes imposing civil and criminal penalties for athleteEleven states classified all or some agent
agent misconduct.6 8
improprieties as felony offenses, while the remaining states classified
agent misconduct as a misdemeanor.6 9 Most state statutes included
provisions governing the following aspects of an athlete-agent's
business:
(1) restrictions on the agent's license; (2) posting and forfeiture of surety bonds or
malpractice insurance; (3) legal validity of the agent contract and the athlete's ability to
rescind the contract; (4) forfeiture of the agent's right to repayment of items paid on
behalf of the athlete; (5) refunds of monies paid to the agent by the athlete or on her
behalf; (6) civilladministrative fines; (7) civil causes of action against the agent by the
athlete, university, state, or other injured person or business; and (8) criminal fines or
70
imprisonment.

Notably, this developing statutory scheme placed a complex
compliance burden on athlete-agents. 71 The disjunction of regulations
among the states created an atmosphere of noncompliance and non-

63.
64.
(2010).

See Gray, supra note 48, at 143-44.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§

1

Gray, supra note 48, at 144.
65.
66.
See infra Part II.A
67.
Sudia & Remis, supra note 46, at 268-69; see also Willenbacher, supra note 12, at
1237 (arguing that states have a great incentive to create statutes restricting agents' conduct
and protecting student-athletes due to the economic impact potential sanctions could have on the
state economy).
68.
Sudia & Remis, supra note 46, at 271-72.
69.
Id. at 273.
70.
Id. at 274.
71.
See id. at 275.
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enforcement. 72 Various state registration requirements rendered
compliance extremely costly and time-consuming, since most agents
operated in many states.7 3 Agents rarely followed the reporting or
surety bond requirements because the cost of compliance often
outweighed the penalties, and prosecution was unlikely. 74 Although
state statutes covered many of the same subjects, they varied on
critical points, including: the definition of a "student-athlete";
individuals exempt from registration; registration and renewal
procedures and fees; disclosure and education requirements; and the
content, form, and timing of required notice to athletes and
educational institutions by agents. 75
Additionally, many state
statutes directly conflicted with existing NCAA regulations (by
prohibiting student-athlete and agent interaction altogether, for
example), cancelling out the few protections actually provided for
student-athletes by the NCAA bylaws.76 The statutory scheme, as it
stood in 2001, discouraged agent compliance because it was vague,
burdensome, and costly. 77 Despite the developing body of law and
growing awareness of agent misconduct, effective punishment has
been rare.7 8
3. The Uniform Athlete Agents Act
In 1997, at the behest of the NCAA and its member
institutions, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) began developing a model uniform agent
regulation. 79 In 2000, the NCCUSL drafted the Uniform Athlete
Agents Act (UAAA), to regulate agents and protect educational
institutions, as well as, to a lesser extent, student-athletes.8 0 To
encourage voluntary compliance by agents, the UAAA sought to
72.
See Jeremy J. Geisel, Disbarring Jerry Maguire: How Broadly Defining
"Unauthorized Practice of Law" Could Take the "Lawyer" out of "Lawyer-Agent" Despite the
Current State ofAthlete Agent Legislation, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 225, 233 (2007).
73.
Sudia & Remis, supra note 46, at 275. (noting that registering and paying fees in
multiple states would be very costly, perhaps cost-prohibitive for young agents, and that the
multiple and disparate forms and references required across the country made registering timeprohibitive for all agents).
74.
See id. at 276.
75.
Davis, supra note 13, at 808.
76.
See Sudia & Remis, supra note 46, at 281.
77.
Id.
78.
Willenbacher, supra note 12, at 1237.
79.
Lloyd Zane Remick & Christopher Joseph Cabott, Keeping Out the Little Guy: An
Older Contract Advisor's Concern, a Younger ContractAdvisor's Lament, 12 VrL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 1, 5 (2005).
80.
See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT, Prefatory Note, http://www.law.upenn.edulbllI
archives/ulcluaaalaaall30.pdf (discussing UAAA purpose) [hereinafter UAAA].
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establish a uniform scheme of state regulations by standardizing
agent registration, reporting, record keeping, and punishable
misconduct across all adopting states.81 As of January 2011, forty
states and two territories have adopted the UAAA, with three states
operating under non-UAAA athlete-agent regulatory schemes. 82
The UAAA's principal regulatory mechanism is the registration
requirement, 83 whereby all agents seeking to contact a student-athlete
within a given state must first register with the appropriate state
authority. 84 However, the Act provides an exception for those athleteagents contacted by a student-athlete or someone acting on his behalf,
so long as no agency contract is executed and the agent submits a
registration application within seven days of his first act as a sports
agent.8 5 Any agency contract formed in violation of this section is
void, and the student-athlete must return any consideration received
under the contract.8 6 The UAAA imposes a standardized scheme of
agent registration, requiring disclosure of a potential agent's (1)
training, experience, and education; (2) criminal history regarding
felonies and crimes of moral turpitude; 87 (3) legal history of false or
deceptive representations; (4) previous denial, suspension, or
revocation of licensure in any state; and (5) prior sanctions,
suspensions, or declarations of student-athlete ineligibility.8 8
Although the disclosure and reporting requirements appear daunting,
the UAAA permits agents to cross-file applications across all UAAA
jurisdictions, simplifying the registration and vetting processes. 89 The
UAAA does not, however, designate a uniform registration fee. 90
The UAAA further regulates the form of an agency contract
and provides for notice to the contracting student-athlete's educational
81.
See id.
82.
FAQ
on Uniform Athlete Agents Act,
NCAA.ORG
(July 29,
2010),
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/publiclNCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2010+news+stories/
July+latest+news/FAQ+on+Uniform+Athlete+Agents+Act. California, Michigan, and Ohio have
non-UAAA laws. The remainder of the states, including Alaska, Massachusetts, Montana,
Maine, New Jersey, Vermont, and Virginia lack laws directly regulating athlete-agents. See also
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 23-16-204-208 (repealed 2010) (Colorado rescinded its laws in April 2010).
83.
The UAAA's definition of athlete-agent includes all individuals who enter into or
directly or indirectly solicit or recruit a student-athlete to form an agency contract, including
runners, but excluding corporations and business entities, family members, and persons acting
solely on the behalf of professional sports organizations. UAAA, supra note 80, § 2(2) & cmt.
84.
Id. § 4(a).
Id. § 4(b).
85.
86.
Id. § 4(c).
87.
The reporting requirements, aside from education and training, generally apply to
associates of aspiring athlete-agents as well. See id. § 5(a).
Id.
88.
89.
Id. § 5(b).
90.
Id. § 9.
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arrangements, the names of any unregistered persons receiving
compensation due to contract formation, and a description of services
to be rendered. 92 Additionally, the UAAA requires that all agency
contracts contain a conspicuous provision informing the studentathlete of the possible forfeiture of NCAA eligibility, the required
notice to his educational institution, and his right to cancel the
contract. 93 Agents may not pre- or post-date any agency contract
Pre- and post-dating
under penalty of criminal sanctions.94
prohibitions limit the extent to which agents may contractually bind
student-athletes while circumventing eligibility and reporting
concerns.9 5 Contracts that violate the notice and dating requirements
are voidable by the student-athlete, who need not reimburse the
agent.96
To protect educational institutions and prevent sanctions
arising from the participation of ineligible players, the UAAA
mandates that both the contracting student-athlete and agent provide
notice to the athletic director of the affected NCAA member
institution,9 7 either within seventy-two hours of the agreement's
signing or before the athlete's next scheduled competition, whichever
occurs first.9 8 The UAAA stipulates that a contracting student-athlete
retains the unwaivable right to unilaterally void his agency contract
within fourteen days of signing the agreement, 99 with no requirement
to return any consideration received.1 00 Under the UAAA, agents
must maintain executed contracts and other records-including
information regarding clients and recruitment expenditures-for five
years, open to review by the state.1 0 1

91.
Id. §§ 10-11.
Id. § 10(b).
92.
Id. § 10(c).
93.
94.
Id. § 14(b)(5).
See id.
95.
Id. § 10(d).
96.
In the case of an uncommitted high school athlete or transfer student, the UAAA
97.
requires that an agent provide notice to any school where he has reasonable grounds to believe
the athlete intends to enroll. Id. § 11(a).
Id. § 11.
98.
This statutory waiver right, however, does not affect collegiate eligibility, which
99.
terminates upon the entering into any agreement with an agent, regardless of its legal
enforceability. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 25, § 12.1.2(g).
100.
UAAA, supra note 80, § 12. This statutory waiver right, however, does not affect
collegiate eligibility, which terminates upon the entering into any agreement with an agent,
regardless of its legal enforceability. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 25, § 12.1.2(g).
101.
Id. § 13.
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The UAAA also prohibits certain agent conduct and imposes
civil and criminal penalties on violators. 10 2 Agents face criminal
penalties if they provide materially false or misleading information or
make a materially false promise or representation with the intent of
inducing an agency contract. 103 Agents are also proscribed from
providing anything of value to a student-athlete or anyone associated
with her before executing an agency contract. 1 04 The UAAA also
penalizes agents for the following conduct: initiating contact with a
student-athlete before registering in a given state, refusing to
maintain or allow inspection of records, failing to register, registering
with false or misleading information, or failing to include the required
notice to student-athletes in agency contracts.1 0 5
In addition to criminalizing the above conduct, the UAAA
provides for civil remedies by granting educational institutions a
cause of action against an agent or student-athlete for any damages
suffered as a result of violating the Act, including losses and expenses
incurred from sanctions by the NCAA or athletic conference, selfimposed sanctions undertaken in anticipation of and to mitigate
potential penalties, and associated party costs and reasonable
attorney's fees.10 6 Notably, the UAAA also allows for an official of
affected states, such as the Secretary of State, 107 to assess a civil
penalty of up to $25,000 against an agent for violating the Act.10 8
Furthermore, the Secretary of State, upon proper notification and
hearing, may suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew an agent's
registration for conduct violating the UAAA. 109
4. Federal Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act
In 2004, Congress enacted the Sports Agents Responsibility
and Trust Act ("SPARTA"), 110 modeled after the UAAA, to protect

Id. §§ 14-15.
102.
103.
Id. § 14(a)(1)-(2).
104.
Id. § 14(a)(3).
Id. § 14(b).
105.
106.
Id. § 16.
The UAAA designates the Secretary of State as the default enforcement officer;
107.
however, states may designate the state officer of their choosing as the primary enforcer when
adopting the Act. Id. § 3 cmt.
Id. § 17. Again, $25,000 is the default penalty provided by the UAAA, but a state
108.
may elect to use whatever fine it decides when enacting the Act. Id.
109.
Id. §§ 6-7.
110.
15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-08 (2006). Prior to 2004, federal law played an important, albeit
punctuated, role in the regulation of agent conduct. Davis, supra note 13, at 811-12. Notorious
agents were criminally prosecuted for federal mail and tax fraud, money laundering, and
violations of Securities and Exchange Commission regulations, resulting in some of the largest
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educational institutions and student-athletes from agent malfeasance
in recruitment.'
Congress' primary goal in passing SPARTA was to
deter agents from offering improper inducements and misleading
information to student-athletes and to discourage student-athletes
from accepting such inducements. 112 SPARTA prohibits agents from
directly or indirectly recruiting or soliciting a student-athlete's entry
into an agency contract by the provision of false or misleading
information, the making of a false promise, or providing anything of
value to a student-athlete or his family, friends, or associates,
including loaning money and acting as a guarantor.1 13 Like the
UAAA, SPARTA prohibits contractual pre- and post-dating and
imposes affirmative obligations on agents, including required
disclosures in agency contracts and notice to educational institutions
upon the signing of an agency agreement.1 14 Unlike the UAAA,
SPARTA does not create a uniform registration system, although it
does encourage states to adopt the UAAA to that end.s1 5
SPARTA also establishes a system of sanctions for deceptive
acts or practices and grants enforcement powers to the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). 116 The FTC may issue injunctions or impose
monetary penalties of up to $16,000 for each SPARTA violation. 1 17
Additionally, the statute authorizes state attorneys general to bring
civil actions on behalf of a state's population in federal court if a
SPARTA violation adversely affects the interests of that state's
residents.1 18 Moreover, like the UAAA, SPARTA provides educational
institutions a federal cause of action against agents and studentathletes whose SPARTA violations result in institutional expenses,
including NCAA-imposed penalties, disqualification, suspension, or
restitution arising from institution-imposed penalties in anticipation
of NCAA compliance actions.1 19

punishments of agents to date. Id. However, these penalties were also limited to the most
egregious cases. Id.
111.
See H.R. REP. No. 108-24(11), at *1022.
112.
See id.
113.
15 U.S.C. § 7802(a)(1)-(2).
114.
Id. §§ 7802(a)(3)-(b), 7805(a).
115.
Id. §§ 7802, 7807 ("It is the sense of Congress that States should enact the Uniform
Athlete Agents Act of 2000 drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, to protect student athletes and the integrity of amateur sports from unscrupulous
sports agents.").
116.
Id. § 7803 (The FTC is empowered to enforce violations of SPARTA as an unfair or
deceptive trade practice as if all applicable sections of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006), were incorporated into SPARTA).
117.
15 U.S.C. §§ 45(1)-(m) (2010); 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.98 (2011).
118.
15 U.S.C. § 7804(a).
119.
Id. § 7805(b).
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5. Professional Players Associations Regulations
Players associations, as unions of professional athletes, have
exclusive authority to represent their members on matters relating to
the terms and conditions of their employment, including contracts and
salaries. 120 Unlike typical unions, however, players associations have
generally negotiated only the framework of employment conditions in
collective bargaining agreements ("CBA") with team owners and have
delegated authority to negotiate individual players' contracts to agents
or representatives approved by the association. 12 1 Thus, players
associations have broad authority over agents, including the ability to
determine which agents are certified to represent their member
athletes, to establish rules governing certified agents' representation,
and to sanction agents who violate those rules. 122 The National
Football League Players Association (NFLPA) has described agents as
"in

nearly all respects . . . like employees

of the

sports unions

themselves." 1 23 As such, courts have repeatedly upheld the authority
of players associations to regulate sports agents. 124
The NFLPA, 125 in 1994, adopted the Regulations Governing
Contract Advisors (RGCA) to govern individuals seeking to represent
players in their negotiations with NFL teams. 126 The NFLPA only
allows certified agents, who meet competency and ethics
The NFLPA
requirements, to conduct contract negotiations. 1 2 7
imposes minimum requirements for certification eligibility, including
an application fee, background check, completion of a written

Ethan Lock, The Regulatory Scheme for Player Representatives in the National
120.
Football League: The Real Power of Jerry Maguire, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 319, 321 (1998).
121.
Id. at 320-21.
122.
Davis, supra note 13, at 816.
123.
Id. at 817.
See, e.g., White v. Nat'1 Football League, 92 F. Supp. 2d 918 (D. Minn. 2000)
124.
(holding that teams and the players association intended for agents to be bound by the collective
bargaining agreement, and as such, agents were subject to the regulations and for penalties
thereunder); Black v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000)
(determining that agent agreed to terms imposed by CBA in exchange for certification as a
player agent, and therefore must accept provided procedures).
The regulatory systems adopted by each of the major sports players associations are
125.
substantially similar, but contains some differences; this Note will focus on the NFLPA's
regulations because of their comprehensive nature and recent amendments and because of
football's close relationship to ongoing controversies. See generally Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n, MLBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents (effective Oct. 1 2010),
http://reg.mlbpaagent.org/ Documents/AgentForms/Agent%20Regulations.pdf.
126.
Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, NFLPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT
ADVISORS (Mar. 2007), available at http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/PDFs/
SCAA/NFLPARegulations_.ContractLAdvisors.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2011) [hereinafter
NFLPA REGULATIONS].

127.

Id.

§ 2.
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examination, mandatory seminar attendance, and possession of an
undergraduate and post-graduate degree from an accredited
educational institution. 128 The RGCA regulates contracts with a
heavy hand: Any contract that does not meet NFLPA standards is
unenforceable, an unenforceable contract results in no agent
compensation, and a representative's commission is capped at a
maximum percentage. 129 Notably, in 2004, the NFLPA amended its
regulations, requiring that agents disclose, in writing, any payments
made to runners. 130 The NFLPA prohibits agents from improperly
soliciting an athlete, or providing improper inducements, including
money or anything of value, to an athlete or any of his associates, to
obtain an agency contract. 13 1
Under its regulations, the NFLPA may sanction agents who
violate any of the governing provisions, including by suspending
agents, revoking agent certification, and assessing fines. 132 However,
this broad authority has been rarely used.133 Agents and players are
reluctant to testify against offending agents for fear of triggering an
NCAA investigation against their former institution, revealing their
own indiscretions, or implicating a colleague or client. 134 Without
cooperation from athletes, agent misconduct goes largely undeterred,
even with an aggressive union. 135
1I. CURRENT REGULATIONS ARE A POORLY DESIGNED DEFENSE

Despite the common ends each regulatory actor in the current
athlete-agent governance regime seeks, the overall lack of uniformity
and centralization of authority has created a series of compliance
disincentives. Agents are undeterred by minimal penalties that are
rarely imposed and continue to violate the law with impunity, while
athletes and schools face intense scrutiny from the NCAA and the

128.
Id. § 2(A) (An exception is provided for agents who can demonstrate sufficient
negotiation experience).
129.
Id. §§ 4(A)-(B).
130.
Id. § 3(A)(19).
131.
Id. §§ 3(B)(2)-(3).
132.
Id. § (6)(D). The regulations also state that, during a period of suspension, an agent
may be prohibited from collecting fees based on representation agreements. Id. Presumptively,
this indicates that revocation of certification will have the same effect, leading to an effective
avoidance of agency agreements.
133.
See Davis, supra note 13, at 821-23 (noting that, despite an increased number of
complaints, player's association enforcement has been stymied to a large extent by a reluctance
to cooperate).
134.
Id. at 823.
135.
See id.at 822 (noting how non-cooperation has made enforcement of agent
regulations very difficult).

674

VANDERBILT J. OFENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 13:3:657

public. 136 Because institutions of higher learning cannot be full-time
babysitting services, unprotected student-athletes or their families
may frequently face semi-coercive situations with far more
sophisticated parties, bearing full responsibility for the smallest
misstep. 137 "[L]egislation is only as good as the people who enforce it,
and the people that actually take into account what's going on about
it,"138 but when non-enforcement and apathy are the norms of state
enforcement, even the most comprehensive legislation is useless. Too
many gaps in the defensive design and too little motivation by the
players on the field allow agents to score at will.
A. Non-Enforcement and Ineffective Deterrents
An Associated Press report released in August 2010 revealed
that, "more than half of the 42 states with sports-agent laws have yet
to revoke or suspend a single license, or invoke penalties of any
sort."1 3 9 The same report showed that most other states described
their athlete-agent laws as having been enforced only a few times or
rarely. 140 Likewise, the Federal Trade Commission has failed to take
aggressive action under SPARTA, with few filed complaints, no
penalties. 141
statutory
minimal
and
actions,
enforcement
Pennsylvania has only issued four fines against sports agents since
2003 and none greater than $1,000.142 In April 2010, the Colorado
legislature rescinded the state's 2008 athlete-agent regulations, after
only four agents registered in compliance with the act. 143 Georgia
dissolved its regulatory commission in July 2010, transferring
enforcement duties to its Secretary of State, and Delaware plans to
follow suit.144

Willenbacher, supra note 12, at 1241-42.
136.
137.
Josh Luchs: States Must Enforce Laws, ESPN.coM (Oct. 13, 2010, 10:54 AM),
[hereinafter Josh Luchs] ("Twenty-four
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5681002
hours a day, seven days a week, people [are] coming at [players] from all different angles .. . . As
good as [sic] job these coaches may want to do to try to shield these players, they're only human
beings and they're trying to win football games.").
138.
Symposium, The Uniform Athlete Agents Act, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 345, 364
(2003) (statement of Tony Agnone) [hereinafter UAAA Symposium].
139.
Report: State Agent Laws Unenforced, ESPN.COM (Aug. 17, 2010, 4:20 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=5470067 [hereinafter AP Report].
140.
Id. ("One of the few examples of a state enforcing the law with some consistency is
Texas, which has taken disciplinary action against 31 agents in the past two years, levying a
total of $17,250 in fines."). Id.
141.
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
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North Carolina illustrates the problems with enforcing the
UAAA and SPARTA. 145 Because many of its sports agency laws have
no direct funding mechanism, no dedicated resources, and therefore no
dedicated enforcement, the state was forced to conscript state
securities fraud personnel to investigate recent allegations of agent
malfeasance. 146 In March 2010, the North Carolina Secretary of State
opened an investigation into alleged agent improprieties within the
University of North Carolina football program, issuing a search
warrant for the financial records of NFL agent Gary Wichard a full
year after allegations of improprieties came to light and four months
after NFLPA suspended Wichard.147 In addition to the funding
problem facing many states, 148 prosecutorial discretion also limits
enforcement. Put succinctly, "[i]f you've got bank robbers and rapists,
white-collar crime-how many agent issues should be raised to the top
of some prosecutor's desk?" 149
The NCAA suffers from inadequate resources and scant
potential penalties,
obstacles frustrating
effective universal
enforcement.150
With few dedicated investigatory personnel and
limited funding, the NCAA is often a passive enforcement body,
relying on information about improper contact or benefits brought to
its attention by third parties, rather than independently discovered.151
As such, NCAA member institutions are reluctant to prosecute, or
even investigate, agents for fear of inviting NCAA sanctions, or worse,
a full-scale NCAA investigation into the program. 152 In addition, the
NCAA may only impose penalties on the individual athletes and
schools-the only applicable sanctions for agents come from the law,
which currently has no bite. 15 3

145.
AP Report, supranote 139.
146.
Id.
147.
Agent's
Financial
Records
Sought,
ESPN
(Mar.
2,
2011),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=6174078. Although this timing represents a major
step forward for state enforcement, the time gap between allegations and investigation goes to
show the significant difficulties facing the current regulatory regime.
148.
Steve Yanda, Laws Restricting ImproperAgent Contact with NCAA Athletes Seen as
Ineffective, WASH. POST, July 23, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/07/22/AR2010072205898.html.
149.
AP Report, supranote 139.
150.
Yanda, supra note 148 (quoting sports agent Darren Heitner).
151.
Yanda, supra note 148,
Id. According to Alabama Head Football Coach Nick Saban, "You know, we probably
152.
could have prosecuted [the agent] ... [blut in prosecuting the guy that did wrong, we would have
put our institution in jeopardy .... ). Id.
Id.
153.
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Despite the availability of civil causes of actions for aggrieved
educational institutions under SPARTA and the UAAA,1 54 a variety of
factors, beyond the initiation of NCAA sanctions, discourage schools
from proceeding against agents or student-athletes.1 5 5 First, any
potential damages award that an institution may receive from an
agent or former student-athlete would likely be unrecoverable, given
the overall lack of financial resources of most aspiring agents, and
even most professional athletes.15 6 Second, the school would stand to
lose both reputation and general revenue, including the enormous
monetary losses stemming from sanctions. 15 7 Third, initiating a
lawsuit, especially against a prominent former student-athlete, would
keep the violation in public view, and may deter future studentathletes from attending the university.15 8 Additionally, an NCAA
member institution, especially one already subject to NCAA sanctions,
may have difficulty recovering, due to constructive knowledge of the
violations. 15 9 If an institution actively covered up agent malfeasance,
looked the other way, or failed to promote an atmosphere of
compliance, such conduct would severely limit any recovery in ways
similar to contributory negligence.16 0
Although professional players unions could sanction or
decertify agents who violate the applicable regulations, they are
largely "outmanned and basically ineffective" in providing oversight.161
For example, according to former agent Josh Luchs, the NFLPA only
becomes involved in regulating agents "when things fall on their laps"
or "when there's an agent-agent dispute," 162 which renders any
penalty an ineffectual deterrent. Additionally, the NFLPA and other
unions can only regulate potential contract advisors, 163 a category that
excludes "financial advisors, marketers and the other remoras that
circle potential NFL players hoping to siphon off scraps," and "most of

See supra text accompanying note 106. Neither SPARTA nor the UAAA provide
154.
causes of action to student-athletes. Id.
155.
Willenbacher, supra note 12, at 1246.
156.
Id. at 1246-47
157.
Id.
158.
Id. at 1247.
159.
Id. at 1248.
160.
See Gray, supra note 48, at 143 (discussing limitations imposed by student-athlete
contributory negligence).
161.
Josh Luchs, supra note 137.
Id.
162.
163.
Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, REGULATIONS AND CODE OF CONDUCT
GOVERNING REGISTERED PLAYER FINANCIAL ADVISORS 2 (Mar. 2007), available at
http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/images/oldlmages/fck/NFLPAregs(3).pdf.
In 2002,
the NFLPA implemented a voluntary certification program for financial advisors, the first such
program among professional sports unions. Id.
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the dirty [agents] are smart enough to use intermediaries to avoid a
direct connection between agent and player."164
Although the NFLPA has been at the forefront of regulating
the agent industry in professional athletics, it has had difficulty
enforcing its regulations because, as in the collegiate arena,
professional players and agents are reluctant to bring up violations or
testify at hearings. 165 "It is not uncommon for agents anonymously to
inform players associations of the misconduct of other agents or to
make allegations without specifically identifying the alleged offending
agent," but when asked to testify, "the complaining agent will refuse
to do so." 16 6
Wake Forest Law Professor Timothy Davis notes three main
reasons underlying an agent's unwillingness to testify against or
directly identify a peer: (1) concern that their own improprieties will
be uncovered; (2) reluctance to implicate student-athletes; and (3) fear
of retribution from other agents once labeled a "snitch."16 7 Likewise,
athletes are reluctant to implicate unethical agents due to an overall
desire to avoid litigation, a fear of jeopardizing any remaining
collegiate eligibility, and the potential for NCAA sanctions on their
current or former school.168 NCAA member-institution officials and
coaches also have a disincentive to bring violations to light for fear of
NCAA sanctions.169 Finally, professional teams are often hesitant to
report known violations because they "do not want to 'burn bridges'
with the agents with whom they are required to negotiate
contracts."17 0 As such, the NFLPA and other players unions have
largely failed to curb unethical agents' recruitment tactics.171
In the rare case that agents are caught and punished, the
current regulatory regime offers insufficient punishment to deter
misconduct.172 One commentator concludes, "the deterrents imposed

164.
Andy Staples, Saban and Slive Are Powerful Men, but Are Powerless Against Agents,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 22, 2010, 12:09 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/
writers/andy staples/07/22/agents/index.html. But see Liz Mullen, NFLPA Panel of Marketing
Agents Meets for First Time, SPORTS Bus. J. (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.
com/Journal/Issues/2010/10/Oct-18-24/Labor-and-Agents/Marketing-agents.aspx (noting that the
NFLPA reached out to player marketing agents, by convening an advisory committee of player
marketing agents in September 2010).
165.
Davis, supra note 13, at 822.
166.
Id.
167.
Id. at 823.
168.
Id. at 822.
Richard T. Karcher, Solving Problems in the PlayerRepresentation Business: Unions
169.
Should Be the "Exclusive"Representativesof the Players, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 737, 762 (2006).
170.
Id.

171.

Id.

172.

Willenbacher, supranote 12, at 1243.
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by SPARTA, the creation of a civil cause of action for universities and
state attorneys general, as well as FTC penalties, are not
substantially different from deterrents that already exist[ed] ...
[including] state statutes and common law." 17 3 Agents stand to gain
far too much money from successfully recruiting a star client to worry
about the relatively low fines and other penalties imposed by the
UAAA and SPARTA.1 74 Educational institutions already enjoyed
private causes of action under the common law regime.17 5 Likewise,
the small fines and lax enforcement render the remaining civil
penalties toothless.17 6 Additionally, SPARTA and the UAAA do very
little to counteract the tendencies of NCAA member institutions and
student-athletes "to put violations as far in the past as possible" by
not following through on civil actions or testimony, a pattern often
ending with NCAA sanctions, but no guaranteed recovery from
potentially insolvent agents or athletes.1 77

B. Coverage Gaps
A defense designed by one coordinator with a single strategy
can be very effective, but a defense designed by several coordinators,
each with a distinct strategy, even if well-conceived, may fail. First,
certain parts of the field will be left completely uncovered, as in states
without athlete-agent regulations.1 78 Second, agents attempting to
comply with the different defensive principles will soon be
overwhelmed by the sheer complexities of compliance required to even
Finally, some
play the game, as with multi-state regulation.1 79
categories of agents may face additional constraints from outside
sources, leaving less-skilled agents to fill their absence, as when nonlawyers substitute for lawyers18 0
A multi-state registration scheme without centralized
enforcement allows agents to skirt registration and compliance
altogether by conducting their activities in states that either lack
athlete-agent laws or fail to enforce them. 181 Without uniform

Id.
173.
174.
Id. at 1243-44.
175.
See supra Part I.B.2.
176.
Willenbacher, supra note 12, at 1243.
177.
Id. at 1247-48.
178.
See generally AP Report, supra note 139 (noting that eight states do not yet have
laws dealings with sports agents, though others with standardized laws rarely enforce them).
179.
See Remick & Cabott, supranote 79, at 14.
180.
Id. at 15-16.
181.
AP Report, supra note 139 (describing the overall lack of enforcement in states with
athlete-agent regulations).
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enforcement of athlete-agent laws, and incessant media reports of
agent-athlete misconduct, disregard for registration and compliance
has, not surprisingly, become the norm.182 In the absence of a
centralized registration and enforcement regime, a massive collective
action problem plagues the athlete-agent industry.
The current decentralized regulatory regime also creates
compliance problems-similar to what prompted the UAAA.1 83
Currently, universities in forty-nine states have college football
programs, and each of the forty-nine has produced at least one player
on an active NFL roster since the 2008-2009 season.184 As such, a
scrupulous contract advisor must play "the multi-state game,"
registering in as many states as possible to maximize his ability to
build a client base. 185 Despite explicitly recognizing the need for
uniformity and providing for cross-filing and comity among UAAA
states, the Act fails to establish a uniform registration or renewal
fee.18 6 Thus, registering agents face a broad range of registration fees,
which, given the multi-state nature of the industry, can become quite
expensive.18 7 As a corollary, aspiring agents or contract advisors face
a dilemma: bear a potentially large financial burden or ignore the
law.188 Coupled with the inherent competitiveness of the industry,
this dilemma discourages lawful behavior.189
Another potential problem with the current statutory system
governing athlete-agents is the disparity with which the law treats
attorneys versus non-attorney agents. 190 Although the benefits of
having a licensed attorney as an agent may be substantial, especially
to a young athlete,191 licensed attorneys seeking to act as athleteagents face a competitive disadvantage in the market. 192 At the
outset, an attorney "is subject to more extensive regulation than a

182.
See generally id.
183.
Remick & Cabott, supra note 79, at 14.
184.
The sole exception in both of these cases is Alaska, which does not feature a college
football program. The author complied this information by viewing a list of NCAA Division I, II,
and III football programs, and cross-referencing a list of active NFL players and their
undergraduate institutions on ESPN.COM.
185.
Remick & Cabott, supra note 79, at 14.
Id.
186.
Id.
187.
Id.
188.
Id. at 16-19.
189.
190.
See Geisel, supra note 72, at 237.
191.
See Jonathan J. Amoona, Top Pick: Why A Licensed Attorney Acting As A Sports
Agent Is A "Can't Miss"Prospect,21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 599, 609 (2008).
192.
Bryan Couch, How Agent Competition and Corruption Affects Sports and the
Athlete-Agent Relationshipand What Can Be Done to Control It, 10 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 111,
132 (2000).
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non-attorney due to adherence to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and fear of a malpractice action." 193 Additionally, even if nonattorneys are held to similar rules, lawyers are subject to an entire
body of common law precedent governing their conduct. 194 Due to the
tendency of courts to broadly define the unauthorized practice of law,
lawyers face strict regulations on their behavior, even when acting in
other professional capacities.1 9 5 A major concern of attorney-agents is
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law by performing agent
This
duties in states they have not registered as attorneys.19 6
substantially raises the burden of compliance, an unwelcome
disincentive for a class of persons highly qualified to serve as effective
athlete representatives.
C. A Culture of Poverty and Entitlement
When asked by a Sports Illustrated writer whether he received
improper benefits from sports agent Josh Luchs while in college,
former University of Southern California wide receiver R. Jay Soward
confirmed the allegations, stating, "I would do it again . .. I have four
sons, and if somebody offered my son money in college and it meant he
didn't have to be hungry, I would tell him to take it."197 In fact, in
compiling the story on Luchs, an interesting pattern emerged. Several
of the former student-athletes who admitted to receiving money in
violation of NCAA regulations "said they took the payments because
their scholarship didn't provide enough money for rent and food."19 8
Luchs himself justified the benefits on similar grounds: "A lot of
people around [student-athletes] have money and are going out and
enjoying the college experience-a lot of these kids don't even have
enough money to go out and buy groceries . . . clearly, at least in my

case, the money served a purpose."1 9 9
A recent study conducted by Ithaca College and the National
College Players Association (NCPA), an athletes' advocacy group,
showed that "the average 'full scholarship' Division I athlete winds up
having to pay $2,951 annually in school-related expenses not covered
by grants-in-aid." 200 At some schools, according to the report, the
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
PRESS (Oct.

Id.
Geisel, supra note 72, at 237.
Id.
Id. at 240.
Dohrmann, supranote 10.
Id.
Josh Luchs, supra note 137.
Alan Scher Zagier, Study: Scholarship Athletes Still Pay For School, ASSOCIATED
26, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory?id=11969524.
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scholarship and grant shortfall often exceeded the actual cost of
tuition, placing a large burden on student-athletes. 2 0 1 For the many
student-athletes coming to college from disadvantaged backgrounds,
accepting improper benefits may be more need than desire. 202 Ramogi
Huma,203 a former football player at the University of California at
Los Angeles and founder of the NCPA, commented "[t]he amounts of
money [Josh Luchs] talked about giving these players falls within the
scholarship shortfalls.

. .

. These players are putting everything on the

line to get a few bucks in order to make ends meet."2 0 4 Common sense
cannot feed hungry college athletes surrounded by invidious
individuals with deep pockets.
Yet, student-athletes and their coaches, families, and fans,
cannot escape blame for the unethical behavior plaguing college
athletics. 205 A sense of entitlement has become an integral part of the
sports world, characterized by star athletes consistently hearing about
their special gifts and status, and enjoying treatment as though they
are not subject to social constraints from a very early age. 2 0 6
Contemporary youth athletics goes beyond enjoyment, teamwork, and
life experiences, now serving as an ongoing job interview:
Fifth, sixth and seventh grade basketball players are recruited to first play for
prestigious boys and girls AAU basketball programs, and then for even more prestigious
public and private high schools. Youth soccer players are pressed hard to play for highprofile club teams while 11-, 12- and 13-year-old Little League players are now being
pushed to play in weekend showcase events aimed at securing private high school
scholarships and impressing an ever-increasing number of college coaches looking to get
20 7
a jump on their competition.

Eventually, when you tell a young person how superbly extraordinary
his talents are, that seeps into his perception of reality as a whole,
changing his decision-making calculus substantially. 208 When star

201.
202.
203.

Id.
See Josh Luchs, supra note 137.
About
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NCPA

President, NAT'L

COLLEGE
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ASS'N

,

http://www.

ncpanow.org/more?id=0005 (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) (Huma founded the NCPA after
witnessing his All-American teammate at UCLA, Donnie Edwards, serve a suspension from the
NCAA after receiving $150 worth of groceries sent by an agent after his scholarship money ran
out); see also Rob Osborne, Does the Punishment Fit Football Crimes?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1995,
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-11-04/sports/sp-64625_1_redondo-beach-donnie-edwards-shawnwalters.
204.
Zagier, supra note 200.
205.
See Rosenberg, supra note 1.
206.
See Laurie Nicole Robinson, Note, ProfessionalAthletes-Held to a Higher Standard
and Above the Law: A Comment on High-Profile Criminal Defendants and the Need for States to
Establish High-ProfileCourts, 73 IND. L.J. 1313, 1318 (1998).
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Keith Mills, Athlete Entitlement Reaches New Heights at the NFL Draft, PRESSBOX,
http://www.pressboxonline.com/story.cfm?id=6143 (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
208.
See Robinson, supranote 206, at 1319.
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athletes step on a college campus, they witness peers from financially
privileged backgrounds for the first time in their lives. 209 After an
adolescence of adulation, with few tangible benefits, they often begin
to wonder what, if anything, separates their deservedness of needs
and luxuries from that of their peers. If they are such great athletes,
why are they denied what is freely given? 210 Additionally, many star
athletes become focused solely upon developing their professional
career, turning their collegiate career into a mere stepping-stone. 21 1
The isolation of athletes on college campuses only serves to reinforce
this special status, incentivizing them to disregard traditional
deterrents. 212 With the recent NCAA rulings regarding the eligibility
of 2010 Heisman Trophy winner Cam Newton of Auburn and star
quarterback Terrelle Pryor of Ohio State, it may appear to studentathletes and commentators alike that even the NCAA bends its rules
for a bright enough star.213
student-athletes'
fully appreciate
of course,
Agents,
vulnerabilities, propensities, and attitudes, not necessarily out of a
predatory instinct, but as a necessary corollary to their chosen
Nonetheless, a student-athlete's frequently poor
profession. 2 14
background engenders both a lack of sophistication and a need for the
bare essentials, making the athlete vulnerable to the agent's
recruitment tactic of providing basic necessities. 215 Agents also play to
a student-athlete's sense of entitlement, reiterating his special and
deserving status, while offering to give the athlete what he truly
deserves. 2 16 Student-athletes may convince themselves that they have
earned or deserve benefits, that they will escape punishment, or that
they would already be earning the money if not for the college-

209.
See Josh Luchs, supra note 137.
See Robinson, supra note 206, at 1318.
210.
RONALD B. WOODS, SOCIAL ISSUES IN SPORT 133 (Human Kinetics 2007).
211.
Id.
212.
213.
See Mark Emmert Addresses Backlash, ESPN.coM (Dec. 3, 2010, 11:32 AM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5876716 (discussing how Newton was declared
ineligible and eligible in a two-day span prior to the SEC Championship, during which it was
determined that his father had committed NCAA violations that Newton had not known of or
benefitted from-a decision which promoted a significant outcry in college football circles); Ohio
State Football Players Sanctioned, ESPN.CoM (Dec. 26 2010, 10:01 AM), http://sports.
espn.go.com/ncflnews/story?id=5950873 (noting that Pryor has been suspended for the first five
games of the 2011 season for receiving improper benefits, but was allowed to compete in Ohio
State's nationally televised Sugar Bowl contest against Arkansas, as the NCAA found that he,
and four other Buckeyes, had not been adequately educated on NCAA rules.).
See Brandon D. Morgan, Oliver v. NCAA: NCAA's No Agent Rule Called Out, But
214.
Remains Safe, 17 SPORTS LAW. J. 303, 314-15 (2010); see also Willenbacher, supra note 12, at
1247.
See Josh Luchs, supra note 137.
215.
216.
See Rosenberg, supra note 1.
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attendance requirements of professional leagues. 217 Regardless of the
ethics of paying college athletes, the current regulatory scheme does
little to counteract these pressures and vulnerabilities.
III. PLAYING COVER FOUR: FOUR SIMPLE STEPS TO HELP ATHLETES
AND AGENTS PLAY BY THE RULES
Part II of this Note shows that a unifying force drives the
current epidemic facing college athletics today-money. The problem,
however, is that money cannot be eliminated, all parties want more of
it, and virtually all are willing to bend the rules occasionally in
pursuit of it. The question then becomes what logical steps will best
correct the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of the current system, so
as to provide better transparency, greater protections to vulnerable
student-athletes, and stronger disincentives for rule-breakers moving
forward. The ideal solution is multi-faceted, but significantly more
consistent than the current regime: a federal licensing system and
regulatory agency, statutory causes of action for student-athletes,
relaxation of NCAA amateurism regulations, and better reciprocity
between the various regulatory bodies.
A. Uniform FederalAgent Regulation System
Despite its failure to solve all athlete-agent issues, the UAAA
has performed admirably in at least three respects: (1) it partly
remedied the compliance disincentives of the prior agent-regulation
regime; (2) it prompted state and federal legislators to enact
legislation to curb problems arising from agent misconduct; and (3) it
began a more focused discourse by providing a blueprint for the proper
mechanisms of future agent regulations. 218 However, the greatest
problems facing the UAAA regime are what faced the system it
replaced-a lack of uniformity, difficulties with compliance, penalties
without bite, and apathy towards enforcement. 219 Only a federal
scheme can uniformly regulate agents, actively encourage compliance,
and dedicate sufficient resources for enforcement.
Those states
featuring UAAA laws need not rescind it, as the Act could provide a
useful monitoring and enforcement supplement to federal regulation.
However, two major revisions to the UAAA are necessary: (1) explicit
deference to the federal registration and reporting schemes and (2)
removal of state application fees.

217.
218.
219.

See Robinson, supranote 206, at 1318.
See supra Part I.B.3.
See supra Part IIA-C.
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The principal component of any comprehensive regulatory
scheme should be a national registry of sports agents to streamline the
registration process and counteract the existing disincentive to comply
Establishing the Sports Agent
with registration provisions. 220
Licensing and Oversight Commission (SALOC) by amending SPARTA,
while leaving intact the current UAAA/SPARTA agency contract form
and disclosure requirements, would provide a centralized mechanism
to (1) enforce the registration disclosure requirements of the UAAA;
(2) establish a single application process and fee; (3) monitor
registered agents; and (4) bring suits, both criminal and civil, 2 2 1
against non-registered agents who violate the law. A centralized
registration scheme would necessitate some modification in reporting
requirements, including a mandate that agents list the states in which
they practice, and report any conduct in a non-listed state within a
week. 2 2 2 As commentators have suggested, a $2,000 registration fee,
plus an annual $1,000 renewal fee, would serve to effective screen
applications and offset registration costs. 2 2 3 The registration fee's
screening mechanism would ensure that: (1) violating agents are not
judgment-proof; (2) prospective agents understand the seriousness of
their commitments under the law; and (3) funds exist to review the
Also, to further encourage
qualifications of prospective agents.
candidate self-selection and prevent judgment-proof defendants, the
federal licensing scheme should require a minimum level of bonding or
insurance for all registered agents. 224 Although this may raise fees,
the overall reduction in paperwork and registration fees provided by
the centralized federal licensing scheme would offset any additional
costs of compliance.
The next steps, monitoring and enforcement, would require a
few more amendments to the existing SPARTA statute. 225 First,
Congress should criminalize acting as an agent or entering into any
agency agreement without a federal license, absent extenuating
circumstances such as administrative delay. 2 2 6 Criminal penalties, in
contrast to modern regulations, would force agents to weigh the
Willenbacher, supra note 12, at 1249-50.
220.
This mechanism would not otherwise affect the rights of educational institutions to
221.
bring private civil actions, or of student-athletes to bring civil actions. See supra Part I.B.2; see
also infra Part III.B. (discussing changes to student-athlete civil actions).
222.
Conduct would necessarily be defined as including actions conducted on behalf of, or
in place of, the agent, including that by runners.
223.
Remick & Cabott, supra note 79, at 20.
224.
See Gray, supra note 48, at 153.

225.

15 U.S.C. §§7801-08 (2006). The current FTC civil penalties should remain-

although the conduct at issue would be under the direct control and investigation of the
FSALOA.
See Willenbacher, supra note 12, at 1250.
226.
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prospect of liability more seriously-while fines have not successfully
deterred money-driven agents, the prospect of jail time just might. 2 2 7
In addition to criminal penalties, the law should also mandate that
any commissions or other benefits received by an unlicensed agent (or
any intermediary) be forfeited to the SALOC. 2 28
Likewise, the
SPARTA amendments should provide that violations of the
UAAA/SPARTA prohibited-conduct sections may result in temporary
or permanent revocation of licensure, to prevent agents from
benefiting from illegal conduct. 229
Furthermore, to encourage the sports industry to better police
itself, Congress should require professional sports teams and other
entities to verify that the athlete-agents with whom they negotiate
and contract are federally licensed. 230 The provisions governing agent
conduct should conform, as closely as possible, to applicable NCAA
regulations, 231 to prevent confusion and enforcement gaps. 2 3 2 Finally,
Congress should expressly establish that lawyers registered under the
federal agent-licensing scheme would not be engaged in the unlicensed
practice of law while performing typical sports-agent duties in states
where they are not licensed as attorneys, so long as they comply with
SPARTA's conduct and registration provisions. 233
To be effective, both as a regulatory scheme and as a symbolic
measure, new legislation must include sufficient funding. Congress
should establish a funding program for the states whereby each state
that establishes a compliance agency receives minimum federal
funding for the program, with matching federal funds for each stateallocated dollar beyond the minimum. State officials would then be
the primary investigatory and enforcement arms of the regulatory
scheme, bringing claims directly under the state UAAA law, and
227.
See David Brandt, Law Enforcement Probes NCAA Issues Under Agent Act, WASH.
TIMES (Dec. 8, 2010, 4:17 PM), http://www.bellinghamherald.com/2010/12/08/1761033/lawenforcement-probes-ncaa-issues.html (noting that under current laws, a violating agent's
"[w]orst case scenario, you're probably looking at a guy getting probation and paying a fine. He'll
walk home that day.").
228.
See Willenbacher, supra note 12, at 1250.
229.
See id.
230.
See id. at 1251 ("While this restriction seems harsh, it does a great deal to protect
the athlete at a relatively minor inconvenience for the large corporations or sports franchises
that employ them.").
231.
See discussion infra Part I.C (discussing possible changes in NCAA athlete-agent
regulations).
232.
See Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act: Hearing on 107 H.R. 4701 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce Trade and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
107th Cong. 20-21 (June 5, 2002) (statement of Howard Beales, Dir. of the Bureau of Consumer
Prot. at the Fed. Trade Comm'n) [hereinafter Commerce Hearing] (discussing the potential for
friction between NCAA regulations and SPARTA's more inflexible requirements).
233.
See Geisel, supra note 72, at 245-46.
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reporting violations to the federal agency. The SALOC should be
primarily concerned with registration, reporting, and coordination,
with the power to recommend FTC enforcement and criminal actions.
This centralized and specialized funding system could counteract the
inertia of the status quo, ensuring that compliance at least appears on
a state's priority list.

B. Student-Athlete Statutory Causes of Action
Although the UAAA and SPARTA preserve existing causes of
action available under common law, neither explicitly protects the
interests of student-athletes by providing a statutory cause of
action. 234 A second step toward meaningful reform of the current
agent regulation regime would be to provide current and former
student-athletes a statutory cause of action against agents who
damage their careers, scholarships, or reputations by causing them to
lose their collegiate eligibility. 235 Student-athletes stand to lose
athletic scholarships, educational opportunities, and the possibility of
a professional career, yet are effectively unable to recover because of
the difficulty of proving causation by the agent and the doctrine of
contributory negligence. 236 A cause of action under SPARTA and the
UAAA would overcome these difficulties. A statutory cause of action
that precludes contributory negligence or comparative fault as an
affirmative defense would provide a direct means of enforcement by
the aggrieved party against the unethical agent. Essentially, violation
of the relevant provisions would place the burden on agents, who
would need more than complicity by the athlete to escape liability.
Facing student-athletes armed with a statutory cause of action
and substantial statutory remedies, agents could no longer conceal
of student-athletes. 2 37
complicity
behind
wrongdoing
their
Additionally, a civil remedy would permit student-athletes to protect
their interests, regardless of whether a criminal or FTC proceeding
ensues. 238 Confronted with a reformed statutory scheme, agents
weighing the putative costs and benefits of unscrupulous conduct
would find far higher costs than current regulations provide. Not all

234.
Gray, supra note 43, at 153.
See Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 22, at 13 (statement of Scott Boras)
235.
(arguing for the propriety and potential effectiveness of a private cause of action for studentathletes).
236.
Gray, supra note 48, at 153.
237.
Id.
238.
See Commerce Hearing, supra note 232, at 20-21 (statement of Howard Beales)
(proposing that a private right of action could serve to further promote the interests of studentathletes when NCAA and federal regulations may not).
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illegal or unethical conduct can be deterred, but a few adjustments
would make agents think twice.
C. Redefining Amateurism and Relaxing Athlete-Agent Conduct
Provisions
Realistic observers of the modern intercollegiate athletics
landscape will undoubtedly notice "extraordinary amounts of money
changing hands, fierce competition among collegiate athletes for
professional opportunities, and the wholesale flouting of many rules
that are intended to promote and preserve amateurism." 2 3 9 "For the
most talented college athletes, college play can resemble major league
tryouts." 240 Given the stakes and amount of money involved, it should
surprise no one that the NCAA is reacting to new varieties of agent
misconduct and closing loopholes in existing regulations, rather than
consistently pursuing any coherent proactive policy. 2 4 1 Essentially, in
trying to maintain its traditional concept of amateurism in a distinctly
modern age, the NCAA is "governing out of a covered wagon."2 4 2 The
NCAA's only hope for effective regulation of major college athletics is
to recognize "that collegiate sports is now big business . . . that there

are a lot of attendant and subsidiary commercial interests . .. that are
going to always be out there where they're not going to be able to
regulate them." 2 4 3 In the absence of a coherent process of controlled
NCAA deregulation of student-athlete interactions with agents as
proposed by this Note, the NCAA's rules will be frequently flouted and
rarely enforced.
Perhaps no NCAA amateurism rule has been as roundly
criticized in the past decade as the "no agent" rule, described as "an
example of overly restrictive and ineffective rules that define
amateurism in a way that is too tightly linked to the ideal of
amateurism rather than a description of amateurism based in
reality." 24 4 The current NCAA regulations are largely silent on
permissible and impermissible agent conduct, largely due to the body's
inability to regulate agent conduct directly. 245 Instead, the NCAA's
amateurism distinction turns on whether an agent merely advises a

239.
Fitt, supra note 4, at 567.
240.
Id.
241.
See id. at 568.
242.
Id.
243.
Symposium, Are We Playing By the Rules? A Debate Over the Need For NCAA
Regulation Reform, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 439, 443-44 (2004) (statement of Linda BenselMeyers).
244.
Fitt, supra note 4, at 569-70.
245.
Karcher, supra note 34, at 223.
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student-athlete ex parte or whether the agent has direct contact with
a professional team or executes a written agency agreement.2 4 6
However, as Professor Karcher suggests, "permitting a student-athlete
to retain competent representation .. . would not destroy the line of
demarcation any more than allowing the student-athlete or the
[institution's] professional sports counseling panel to engage in the
same conduct." 247
Indeed, it would appear that the NCAA's idealistic regulations
actually tend to subjugate the student-athlete's best interests in these
Student-athletes and their families typically lack the
matters.
necessary sophistication to sign agency contracts or make sound
decisions related to professional prospects. 248 For a student-athlete
weighing the costs and benefits, the cost of following the no agent rule
is a competitive disadvantage, while the benefit is no liability. Given
the minimal risks of enforcement, however, this is hardly a benefit, so
the calculus often results in a violation of amateurism rules. 2 4 9
Likewise, the no agent rule offers no protection to graduating high
school students, especially those selected in the Major League
Baseball draft, as they have no access to professional sports
However,
counseling panels at NCAA member institutions. 2 5 0
counseling panels for current student-athletes offer little protection,
as generally, panel members are wholly unqualified in athletic-talent
evaluation, and a conflict of interest is likely. 2 5 1 Thus, the better
solution is not to limit a student-athlete's options, but to enhance
them, by allowing agency contracts, albeit with greater oversight.
In Oliver v. NCAA, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, following
this line of thought, departed from its long-standing policy of judicial
deference to NCAA regulations, declaring the NCAA's "no agent rule"
arbitrary and capricious and issuing a permanent injunction
reinstating the eligibility of Oklahoma State pitcher Andrew Oliver. 2 5 2
Although the preliminary order was vacated when the case settled,
and the NCAA continues to enforce its "no agent rule," the presiding
judge warned the NCAA that its rule may be void. 2 5 3 Whatever effect
the ruling in Oliver may have moving forward, its analysis of the "no

246.
247.

Id.
Id.

248.
249.
250.

See id. at 224.
Fitt, supra note 4, at 572.
Karcher, supra note 34, at 224.

251.

Id.

252.
T. Matthew Lockhart, Oliver v. NCAA: Throwing a Contractual Curveball at the
NCAA's "Veil of Amateurism," 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 175, 177-78 (2010).
253.
Id. at 178.
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agent rule" provides an excellent building-block for effective reform.
Specifically, Judge Tone wrote:
For a student-athlete to be permitted to have an attorney and then to tell that studentathlete that his attorney cannot be present during the discussion of an offer from a
professional organization, is akin to a patient hiring a doctor but the doctor is told ...
that he cannot be present when the patient meets with a surgeon because the conference
may improve his patient's decision-making power. . . . If the [NCAA] intends to deal
with . .. any athlete in good faith, the student athlete should have the opportunity to
have the tools present . .. that would allow him to make a wise decision without
254
automatically being deemed a professional.

The NCAA's purported maintenance of amateurism currently does
little more than protect the NCAA's primary economic interests and
isolate student-athletes from competent representation, maintaining a
climate in which unethical agents thrive and take advantage of
unsophisticated young adults. 255
A broader, more permissive
definition of amateurism would enable student-athletes to pursue
their self-interest outside of the black market, permitting actual
oversight rather than occasional enforcement. Armed with better
information and without the prospect of punishment upon discovery, a
student-athlete's interactions with an agent should become more of a
legitimate business relationship. The NCAA has established a very
narrow definition of amateurism within the permissible bounds of the
law; for a more effective, liberalized definition, it need only look to its
fellow amateur organizations, including the U.S. Olympic Association
and F6d6ration Internationale de Basketball (FIBA), the governing
body of international basketball.2 56
The NCAA should adopt amateurism bylaws similar to those of
FIBA, which permits amateur athletes to receive stipends, living
expenses, housing, and scholarships, as well as sign agency contracts
with straightforward terms. 257 Notably, by removing many of the
restrictions that currently plague the system, the NCAA will actively
promote informed decision making by its student-athletes and ethical
conduct by agents. In place of the current paternalistic rules, the
NCAA can better protect both its athletes and its amateur ideal by
permitting student-athletes to enter into agency contracts with
federally licensed agents, subject to standard terms and conditions. 258
Standardized contractual forms, such as those maintained by
the NFLPA, would serve to replace black-market transactions and
254.
Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203, 214-15 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pl. 2009).
255.
See Morgan, supra note 214, at 315.
256.
See Fitt, supra note 4, at 584.
257.
INT'L BASKETBALL FED'N, INTERNAL REGULATIONS: REGULATION H, RULES
GOVERNING PLAYERS, COACHES, SUPPORT OFFICIALS, AND PLAYERS' AGENTS (2010), available at
http://www.fiba.com/downloads/Regulations/170310_FIBAInternalRegulations.pdf.
258.
See Karcher, supranote 34, at 224.
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loose understandings between student-athletes and agents or runners
that exist today. 259 Likewise, mandatory reporting requirements
would grant NCAA member institutions greater oversight and protect
student-athletes, rather than merely seeking to protect the institution
from NCAA investigation and sanctions. Colleges and universities
would then be able to educate student-athletes and help guide their
decisions, rather than forcing them to make decisions on their own,
often leading to unscrupulous activities. 260 Prominent sports agent
Scott Boras has defended the proposition, stating:
Student athletes and their families rarely understand the complexity of the NCAA and
professional sports rules. In most instances, athletes are only left with the information
that is given to them by a university or outside counsel. The decision whether to forego
a college scholarship and pursue a professional career requires sophisticated analysis
261
and legal counsel.

A related change to current NCAA regulations that would
preserve amateurism, protect student-athletes, and recognize the
reality of modern intercollegiate athletics would be to permit studentathletes with agency agreements to receive a private loan, cosigned by
their agent, not in excess of $15,000 per year. Although this would not
eliminate the provision of improper benefits, it would provide a
legitimate outlet to student-athletes with both needs and wants
beyond the money provided by their scholarships. The maximum loan
amount, albeit arbitrary, would serve two major purposes. First,
capping the loan amount would offer some protection to studentathletes by limiting the amount of financial liability incurred while
enrolled. Second, the cap would enable the NCAA to maintain some
traditional conception of amateurism, as the maximum would
realistically mirror a loan amount available to any other student for
living expenses. 262
By cosigning a student-athlete's loan, the agent would enable
the student to receive a line of credit, which realistically would make
little difference compared to the opportunities available to many other
students from wealthier families. Although allowing agents to cosign

259.
Id.
260.
See UAAA Symposium, supra note 138, at 373 (statement of Craig Fenech, sports
agent).
261.
JudiciarySubcomm. Hearing,supra note 22, at 12-13 (statement of Scott Boras).
In calculating student eligibility for federal financial aid, the U.S. Department of
262.
Education considers a student's cost of attendance, including tuition, room and board (living
expenses), books and supplies, etc. U.S. Dep't of Educ., Student Aid Eligibility, STUDENT AID ON
(last
THE WEB, http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/englishlaideligibility.jsp
updated July 12, 2010). The College Board's base (average) moderate student living expense
budget for 2011-12 was $17,820 for 9 months. Living Expense Budget 2011, COLLEGEBOARD,
(last visited
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/data-reports-research/trends/living-expense
Mar. 4, 2011).
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loans could create new pressures on student-athletes and permit
agents to manipulate athletes, as long as the lending process itself is
transparent, the loans may counteract some of these pressures.
Because the loan would come from a bank, rather than from the agent
directly, there would be less potential for abuse: The athlete would
owe money to the bank, and the agent would only become responsible
for the transaction if the athlete failed to pay the loan. In contrast to
contemporary under-the-table payments, there would be nothing in
the loan transaction providing the agent leverage vis-A-vis the athlete.
The external source of the loan would create greater transparency,
ensure repayment of the loan once the student-athlete began his
professional career, and render it less of a direct benefit and more of
an indirect pre-professional salary.
Additionally, student-athletes and NCAA member institutions
should not be punished for an agent's provision of improper benefits to
an athlete's family members because, absent proof that the athlete
knows about these benefits, they have very little effect on the athlete's
amateur status. Instead, the NCAA should turn over such evidence to
the appropriate enforcement body to pursue charges. Overall, "the
slight differences between student-athletes and other uniquely
talented individuals do not justify the NCAA's micromanagement of
student-athletes." Only by foregoing measures that tend to stifle the
development of proactive self-interested behavior by student-athletes
can the NCAA truly provide meaningful regulation. 26 3
D. Necessary Reciprocity
A final part of the solution is for each of the relevant regulatory
bodies-Congress, states, the NCAA, and professional players
associations-to recognize that their uncoordinated efforts have been
largely ineffectual, if not counterproductive. Although each body has
similar goals, their competing means, worldviews, and deterrents have
contributed to the current reality of non-compliance and nonenforcement. 264 Congress and the states are primarily focused on
protecting educational institutions, and, to a lesser extent, athletes. 265
The NCAA's primary interest is in maintaining the ideals of amateur
Professional players associations are primarily
competition.2 66
concerned with protecting the interests of current members. 267 In

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See Fitt, supra note 4, at 592.
See supra Part I.B
See supra Part I.B.3-4.
See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 25.
See Davis, supra note 13.
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pursuit of these goals, each body has created disincentives for
individuals to comply with its own athlete-agent regulations, for fear
of violating a provision of a competing actor in the marketplace.
A recent proposal from the NCAA recommended post-collegiate
financial penalties and potential suspensions during a player's rookie
year for individual student-athletes who violate the NCAA's eligibility
bylaws. 268 Although the NFLPA opposes the imposition of such
penalties, 269 the proposal raises interesting possibilities regarding the
reciprocity of resources, investigators, and enforcement across all
major regulatory actors. The first step is for all major professional
players associations to expressly mandate that violators of the
amended SPARTA be decertified as union-approved contract
advisors. 270 Likewise, the players associations should disqualify any
agent who causes an NCAA violation. 2 71 Essentially, the players
associations would act as an enforcement body for both SPARTA and
the NCAA, serving both the players' interests in preserving athletic
integrity and the quality of union-certified agents. 272 The NCAA,
players associations, and state and federal law enforcement officials
should memorialize a commitment to share information and resources
in investigating agent misconduct.
To ensure effective enforcement, the proposed legal scheme
should also provide whistleblower protection.
Although NCAA
institutions, student-athletes, and other agents may suffer the harm
of agent misconduct, the potential drawbacks of bringing the
misconduct to light currently outweigh the benefits in most
situations. 273 As previously discussed, athletes are reluctant to bring
agent misconduct to the attention of their players' union, for fear of
NCAA investigations and sanctions imposed on their former
schools. 274 NCAA institutions hesitate to pursue criminal charges, for
fear of NCAA reprisal. 275 Agents rarely report NCAA violations, for
fear of retribution. 2 76
In the absence of public and private
coordination, agent misconduct will continue to escape punishment.
As such, current or former student-athletes and NCAA institutions
that expose agent misconduct should at least face reduced sanctions
268.
Joe Schad, FinancialPenaltiesfor Players Possible, ESPN.COM (Oct. 26, 2010, 6:22
PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nef/news/story?id=5725836.
269.
Id.
270.
See Gray, supra note 48, at 154.
271.
Id.
272.
See id.
273.
See Willenbacher, supra note 12, at 1246.
274.
Davis, supra note 13, at 823.
275.
See Yanda, supra note 148.
276.
Davis, supra note 13, at 823.
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However, post-NCAA
from the NCAA due to their cooperation.
financial penalties should be recoverable from former student-athletes
who refuse to cooperate with NCAA investigations. Professional
sports franchises should take it upon themselves to report to the
NCAA and the SALOC any dealings they have with student-athletes
and agents. Finally, the SALOC and the players unions should
develop an anonymous reporting mechanism for agents wishing to
report the misconduct of their peers, so as to initiate investigations
without fear of reprisal. Until the relevant actors "come together and
decide that they're going to share information and find one common
goal, they're going to be working against each other."2 77

IV. CONCLUSION
The myriad of rules developed by the NCAA, state and federal
legislatures, and professional players unions regulating athlete-agents
have resulted in a disproportionate burden on unsophisticated
student-athletes and ineffective enforcement of agent misconduct. 27 8
The current system effectively curtails student-athlete autonomy,
while creating disincentives for agents to comply with the relevant
regulations. 279 The problems posed by the current system are only
compounded by the media scrutiny of modern intercollegiate athletics,
with relatively minimal coverage of unscrupulous agents.
Modern society holds student-athletes in high regard for their
on-field accomplishments; however, it also seems to hold studentathletes to higher standards than their peers for their off-field
conduct. 280 Because of this concurrent coddling and scrutinizing,
college athletes are subjected to pressures above and beyond the
classroom and playing field that often contribute to unwise
decisions. 281 Unsophisticated and unprotected, student-athletes must
avoid compensation to maintain eligibility, while earning money for
the NCAA and their universities. 2 82 Unless the realities of modern
intercollegiate athletics replace outdated ideals as the basis for
regulation, regulatory schemes will continue to leave student-athletes
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Josh Luchs, supra note 137.
278.
See supra Part II.
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280.
See Robinson, supra note 206, at 1323 (noting that "the media have become more
critical and are now quick to tear down the pedestals on which they help place ... athletes.").
281.
See SOPHIA JOWETT ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN SPORT 270-71 (Human Kinetics
2007) (describing the importance of social norms and environment in moral decision making of
athletes).
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unprotected from unscrupulous agents, regardless of the source of
regulation or available penalties.
The current regime regulating athlete-agent registration,
recruitment practices, and student-athlete amateurism needs a fullscale overhaul. Current regulations signal that all agents are dirty,
but that young, unsophisticated student-athletes must stand as
beacons of integrity. By centralizing the registration process and
providing greater transparency and autonomy in the agent selection
and retention process, regulators may begin to reflect reality in the
law. Until that point, intercollegiate athletics will continue to be an
elaborate lie, and the biggest losers are the ones who play the games.
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